Sunday

9.15 — 10.30 Plenary Session 7

1. Irish Public Opinion, Economic Growth and the EU: The Case of Referendums
   Matt Qvortrup (Political Scientist, Robert Gordon University)

2. Belgium's Federal System: Dynamic or Unstable?
   Stefan Keukeleire (Political Scientist, University of Leuven)

10.00 — 10.30 Discussion
10.30 — 11.00 Break
11.00 — 12.15 Plenary Session 8 / Workshops

1. Workshop 1: Impediments to a Resolution of the Cyprus Problem

2. Workshop 2: Towards a (Re) United Cyprus

Organised by: Cyprus Sociological Association
Turkish-Cypriot Youth Centres
Neo Cypriot Association
Cyprus Academic Forum

Conference on

the Psycho-Social Aspects of Re-unification

Programme

13th - 15th May

Conference on

the Psycho-Social Aspects of Re-unification

Friday

2.30 — 3.00 Participants' Registration
3.00 — 3.15 Opening Ceremony
3.15 — 4.30 Plenary Session 1

1. Political Psychology, the Study of Conflict and Cyprus
   Ronald Fisher (Political Psychologist, American University)

2. Political Sociology and Ethnic Conflicts
   David Officer (Sociologist, Intercollege)

4.00 — 4.30 Discussion
4.30 — 5.00 Break
5.00 — 6.35 Plenary Session 2

1. Multicultural Societies and the Accommodation of Difference
   Niazi Kizilyürek (Political Scientist, University of Cyprus)

2. Ethnic Pluralism and Co-habitation in Cyprus: A Socio-historical Review
   Peter Loizos (Anthropologist, LSE/Intercollege)

3. Cultural Diversity, Nationalism and National Identity in Cyprus
   Muharrem Faiz (Sociologist, KADEM)

6.05 — 6.35 Discussion

Saturday

[illegible]5 — 10.30 Plenary Session 3

1. Implicit and Explicit Ethnic Attitudes: A Cypriot Investigation
   George Georgiou (Psychologist, Intercollege)

2. Discourses on a Common Future: Greek and Turkish Cypriot Views of the Annan Plan
   Nicos Peristianis (Sociologist, Intercollege)

10.00 — 10.30 Discussion
10.30 — 11.00 Break
11.00 — 12.15 Plenary Session 4

1. Ideological Apparatuses and "Power Sharing" in Cyprus
   Panayiotou Andreas (Sociologist, Frederick)

2. Inventing Traditions: from Nationalism to Post-Nationalism?
   Yiannis Papadakis (Anthropologist, University of Cyprus)

11.45 — 12.15 Discussion
12.15 — 12.45 Break
12.45 — 14.30 Lunch
14.30 — 16.05 Plenary Session 5

1. Future Prospects for a United Cyprus Through Media and Education
   Huseyin Gursan (Director, Bayrak Radio and Television)

2. Psycho-social Impediments to Re-Unification
   Takis Konis (Social Psychologist)

3. Re-Imagining a United Cyprus
   Erol Kaymak (International Relations, EMU)

15.35 — 16.05 Discussion
16.05 — 16.35 Break
16.35 — 17.50 Plenary Session 6

1. Imposed and Proposed Federations: Issues of Self-Determination and Constitutional Design in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Iraq
   Tozun Bahcheli and Sid Noel (International Reletions, King's University College)

2. Canadian Federalism and Possible Lessons for Cyprus
   Sid Noel (International Reletions, King's University College)

17.20 — 17.50 Discussion

Address made by Joseph Bayada on the occasion of the Symposium
"On the Psycho-social Aspects of Re-unification": Nicosia May 13-15

The Cyprus Question remains unresolved for no less than forty years. Throughout these years it went through various stages and finally towards the end of the year 2002, the Annan Plan was submitted. Efforts have been made to analyse this plan from various angles: the economic one, the legal one, which incidentally is rather popular in the South - and of course the political one, for those who seem to be more pragmatic.

Nonetheless, we are inclined to overlook that people in both parts of Cyprus are human beings, with feelings, concerns, anxieties, insecurities and visions. Indeed we never attempted to investigate this aspect of our lives, which is instrumental to many of our views, perceptions and decisions, including our stance and attitudes pertaining to the reunification of our country.

Precisely with this in mind, the New Cyprus Association – not Neo Cypriot as it is wrongly spelled out in the programme – decided along with the other fellow organizers to give the opportunity to delve into this aspect of the Cyprus Question, due regard being had to the realities of Cyprus, drawing at the same time on the experience of other countries which faced in the past or are still facing, similar problems.

Depending on the findings of this symposium, serious thought will be given to embarking on a research programme of some duration, the findings of which could in turn form the basis for the formulation of policies which could eventually bring an end to the tumultuous life in this country, substituting conflict and confrontation for peace, reconciliation and synergy.

ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΨΥΧΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΙ ΣΥΝΤΕΛΕΣΤΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΠΑΝΕΝΩΣΗΣ

Οι τελευταίες κινήσεις και τοποθετήσεις από πλευράς της Ευρωπαικής Ενωσης [δηλώσεις αξιωματούχων της Ευρωπαικής Επιτροπής και πολιτικών ηγεσιών κρατών μελών] παρέχουν ενθαρρυντικές ενδείξεις για την πορεία ένταξης της Τουρκίας στην Ενωση στο ορατό μέλλον. Σε περίπτωση που αυτές οι ενδείξεις μετατραπούν σε σίγουρη προσδοκία με κάποια δεσμευτική απόφαση της Ευρωπαικής Ενωσης π.χ. με τον καθορισμό ημερομηνίας για έναρξη ενταξιακών διαπραγματεύσεων, τότε γίνεται ορατή πραγματικότητα το ενδεχόμενο τερματισμού της κατοχής της βόρειας Κύπρου η οποία είχε και έχει σαν κύριο στόχο την εξυπηρέτηση στρατηγικών συμφερόντων της Τουρκίας . Όπως δήλωσε προσφατα με σαφήνεια εκπρόσωπος της τουρκικής στρατιωτικής ηγεσίας η παρουσία του τουρκικουστρατού στην Κύπρο δεν θα χρειάζεται αν η Τουρκία ενταχθεί στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ενωση. Με αυτές τες προοπτικές και με την σταθερή αντίθεση στην πολιτική της διχοτόμησης από την ΕΕ και το σύνολο της διεθνούς κοινότητας, η επανένωση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας καθίσταται αναπόφευκτη στο εγγύς μέλλον.

Η μορφή της επανένωσης είναι επίσης γνωστή σε γενικές γραμμές εφόσον δεν μπορεί να απέχει από την αποδεκτή και συμφωνημένη βάση δηλ τη διζωνική, δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία (γεωγραφικός διαχωρισμός και συγκυριαρχία των δυο κοινοτήτων) πανω στην οποία διεξάγονται διαπραγματεύσεις μεταξύτων δυο κοινοτήτων κατά τες τελευταίες τέσσερις δεκαετίες. Με βάση το περιεχόμενο των διαπραγματεύσεων αυτων τα Ηνωμενα Εθνη εχουν κωδικοποιήσει τες πιθανες συγκλίσεις των δυο πλευρών και τες έχουν καταγράψει σε διάφορα κείμενα «για μια συνολική συμφωνία επίλυσης του κυπριακού» που επιδόθηκαν κατα καιρούς στούς ηγέτες των δυο κοινοτήτων. Το πιο πρόσφατο και λεπτομερές τέτοιο κείμενο ειναι το γνωστό Σχεδιο Ανναν.

Εφόσον βρισκόμαστε, λοιπόν, μπροστά στο ενδεχόμενο μιας σύντομης επανένωσης, αποτελεί υποχρέωση της κυβέρνησης , της κοινωνίας των πολιτών και βέβαια της επιστημονικής κοινότητας η διεξαγωγή επιστημονικών μελετών για τες διάφορες παραμέτρους και επιπτώσεις της οριστικοποίησης του γεωγραφικού διαχωρισμού και της άσκησης συγκυριαρχίας των δυό κοινοτήτων που απαιτεί η συμφωνημένη μορφή της επανένωσης [διζωνική και δικοινοτική ομοσπονδία].

Όπως είναι γνωστό η κυβέρνηση εχει ήδη ολοκληρώσει τες μελέτες της για τες οικονομικές επιπτώσεις της επανένωσης ενώ η πρωτοβουλία των Ενωμένων Δημοκρατών να κάμουν και να δημοσιοποιήσουν μια δική τους μελέτη προκάλεσε γόνιμες και χρήσιμες συζητήσεις και προβληματισμό . Βέβαια σημειώνεται το γεγονος οτι οι μελέτες και συζητήσεις για τες συνέπειες και επιπτώσεις της επανένωσης επικεντρώνονται, όπως πάντα γινόταν, στες πολιτικές και οικονομικές παραμέτρους. Επαναλαμβάνεται δηλαδη το κλασσικο λάθος των κυβερνήσεων, των οικονομολόγων και των θεσμών του προγραμματισμου στες καπιταλιστικές κοινωνίες να παραγνωρίζεται η κοινωνική και ψυχολογική διάσταση που είναι κεφαλαιώδους σημασίας σε κάθε περίπτωση αλλαγής, ανάπτυξης η και λειτουργίας ανθρωπίνων ομάδων και θεσμών.
Στην περίπτωση που εξετάζουμε εδω οι ψυχολογικοί και κοινωνικοί συντελεστές αποκτούν ακόμη πιο εξέχουσα σημασία εφόσον θα είναι καθοριστικός ο ρόλος τους

για τη λειτουργικότητα και την βιωσιμότητα των διευθετήσεων μονιμοποίησης του γεωγραφικού διαχωρισμού και της συγκυριαρχίας οπου επιδιώκεται.

Σαν μια πρώτη συμβολη στην επιστημονική μελέτη που επιβάλλεται να γίνει παραθέτω πιο κάτω για προβληματισμό των κοινωνιολόγων μας τα κυριώτερα θέματα που πρέπει να μελετηθούν και να συζητηθούν με στόχο την διαμόρφωση θέσεων κα προτάσεων για την σωστή ενημέρωση του λαού και την καθοδήγηση των πολιτικών που θα πάρουν τες αποφάσεις και θα μεθοδεύσουν την επανένωση. Η εγκαιρη και πλήρης ενημέρωση του λαού ειναι εν πάση εριπτώσει απαραίτητη προϋπόθεση της επιτυχίας του εγχειρήματος της επανένωσης εφόσον η οριστικοποίηση του γεωγραφικού διαχωρισμού και η συγκυριαρχία δεν μπορούν να εφαρμοστούν και να διαρκέσουν χωρίς τη κοινή αντίληψη και ταυτόχρονη αποδοχή τους απο τον λαό και στες δυο κοινότητες.

<u>Συναισθηματικη συνδεση με τη γη και την κατοικία και το ιδεώδες του πατριωτισμου</u>

.......Η δευτερη πηγη συναισθηματικης φορτισης, που επεσημανα και επηρεαζει πολυ περισσοτερους απο μας, ειναι η εντονη αντιθεση μας, μεχρι αποτροπιασμου, στον εκτουρκισμο των κατεχομενων με αλλαγη των ελληνικων ονοματων των χωριων μας και την καταστροφη των εκκλησιων μας η την μετατροπη τους σε τζαμια και μουσεια. Εντονη επιθυμια μας και ελπιδα αγαλλιασης και δικαιωσης ειναι να δουμε αυτες τες ενεργειες να ανατρεπονται και να μπορεσουμε ξανα να δουμε και να πουμε την Κυθρεα και το Ριζοκαρπασο με τα ονοματα τους γραμμενα στην εισοδο του χωριου. . Να προσκυνησουμε στο Χρυσοσωτηρο και να ακουσουμε καμπανες σε ολες τες εκκλησιες μικρες και μεγαλες των χωριων μας. Προσμενουμε με πολλη συναισθηματικη φορτιση τον επανελληνισμο των χωριων που εγκαταλειψαμε το 1974. Ειναι απιθανο αν οχι αδυνατο να βρεις ελληνοκυπριο που να μην διακατεχεται απο αυτα τα συναισθηματα οταν μιλα η σκεφτεται τα απαραιτητα συστατικα της σωστης κα δικαιης λυσης του εθνικου μας προβληματος. Ακομα και οταν λογικα και ρεαλιστικα καταλαβαινουμε, οι πιο πολλοι απο μας, οτι αυτα εχουν μεταφερθει με τα χρονια τα πολλα στην περιοχη του ονειρου παρα στον τομεα της πρακτικης στοχοθετησης και παλιν αρνουμεθα να συμβιβαστουμε και ποτε δεν θα δεχθουμε το εγκλημα αυτο της τουρκικης κατοχης. Γιατι ειμαστε συνολικοι ανθρωποι με ολες τες ανθρωπινες ιδιοτητες και οχι μονο λειτουργικοι εγκεφαλοι. Αλλοι λιγο αλλοι πολύ κουβαλαμε μαζι μας την κληρονομια των αιωνων ανελιξης μας μεσα στο ζωικο βασιλειο, ριζωμενοι και πιασμενοι από το χωμα και τες πετρες και τα δεντρα που μας εθρεψαν μας προστατεψαν στες χιλιετιες του αγωνα και της αγωνιας μας για επιβιωση. Τα αγαπησασμε όλα αυτά τα τραγουδησαμε με χιλιαδες στιχους επαινων και σεβασμου. Τα συνδεσαμε με τον πατερα και την μανα μας τα ειπαμε μανα και πατερα και όταν τους ξκαθορισαμε γεωγραφικα συνορα τα δοξασαμε με εκεινο το απαραμιλλο συνθετικο της μανας και του πατερα 'μανα-πατριδα. .

.......Και δεν είναι μονο τα χωρια με τα ονοματα τους αλλα και η σχεδον ψυχοσωματικη συνδεση μας με «τη γη μας η τα χωματα μας» την οποια αναπαραγουν αρχεγονα ενστικτα που δεν μας ξεχωριζουν από τα υπολοιπα μελη του ζωικου βασιλειου στο οποιο ανηκουμε. Υπομενουμε και υποφερουμε μοιρολατρικα **η** κανουμε την καρδια μας πετρα και συμβιβαζομαστε αποχαιρετωντας νοερα για παντα τους αγαπημενους μας τοπους οπω**ς εκαναν τελικα οι Αιβαλιωτες και οι** Σμυρνιοι.;

Μα γινεται η καρδια πετρα ιδιαιτερα οσων γεννηθηκαν και μεγαλωσαν στα κατεχομενα χωρια μα

........Παρόλο που δεν μπορούμε να αρνηθούμε την αλήθεια ότι ο διαχωρισμός , εφόσον υπάρχει, είναι «λειτουργικός» (με την έννοια ότι μειώνει σημαντικά ή εξαλείφει τες ευκαιρίες για συγκρουσιακές σχέσεις,) είναι όμως ανθρωπίνως αδύνατον να δεχθούμε την κυνική και ηθικά διεφθαρμένη λογική του εσκεμμένου και μόνιμου διαχωρισμού των ανθρώπων που αποτρέπει όλες τες σχέσεις ώστε να αποφεύγεται και η σύγκρουση. Η διχοτόμηση της κυπριακής πατρίδας ήταν, ειναι και θα παραμείνει ενα ηθικό και πολιτικό κακούργημα το οποίον όλοι οι κύπριοι έχουν καθήκον να ανατρέψουν με όσες θυσίες χρειαστούν.

........Ο εκτοπισμένος ιδιοκτήτης η ιδιοκτήτρια φτάνουν στο χωριό η την γειτονιά τους και ανακαλύπτουν ότι τους περίμεναν οι τωρινοί κάτοικοι του σπιτιού τους. Ζητούν ευγενικά να δουν το σπίτι τους και ο νυν κάτοικος τους καλωσορίζει εξίσου ευγενικά και τους αφήνει διακριτικά μόνους τους να κυκλοφορούν στα δωμάτια του σπιτιού τους μέχρις ότου αρχίσει κάποια συνομιλία με πρωτοβουλία της πλευράς εκείνης που έχει ξεπεράσει πρώτη τα δάκρυα ή τους λυγμούς. Η συνομιλία αρχίζει και παραμένει σε φιλικά πλαίσια με κοινή την προσέγγιση ότι δεν φταιμε εμείς οι απλοί πολίτες και μακάρι να γίνει κάποια συμφωνία για να λήξει επί τέλους αυτή η απαράδεκτη κατάσταση για όλους μας.

.......Αποφάσισε, λοιπόν, η ΕΚ ιδιοκτήτρια να επισκεφθεί το σπίτι της στο κατεχόμενο χωριό της, έχοντας υπόψη και απορρίπτοντας ως απαράδεκτο το πιο πάνω μοντέλο. Όχι, λέει, αυτά τα τερτίπια δεν είναι σωστά και ξεκίνησε αποφασισμένη να πάει να διεκδικήσει την ιδιοκτησία της. Μπαίνει ,λοιπόν, στο σπίτι της με τον προσήκοντα «αέρα» του ιδιοκτήτη και ανακοινώνει τες προθέσεις της στην τουρκοκύπρια , που το κατοικεί, απαιτώντας ταυτόχρονα διευθέτηση των ενοικίων που δεν έχει εισπράξει τόσα χρόνια. «Το σπίτι αυτό είναι δικό μου!». Η άλλη δεν χάνει καθόλου την ψυχραιμία της και συμφωνεί πλήρως **για την ιδιοκτησία.** Για τα καθυστερημένα ενοίκια, όμως, έχει άλλη άποψη: — Εισηγείται όπως εμείς, που είμαστε δυνατοί και έχουμε και αναγνωρισμένη κυβέρνηση, να βγάλουμε , λέει, έξω τούτους τους .....[χρησιμοποιεί κάμποσα επίθετα] ...τούρκους στρατιώτες που κατακρατούν το δικό της σπίτι και (αφού εισπράξουμε από αυτούς τα ενοίκια που χρωστά) να επιστρέψει εκείνη στο σπίτι της και η ΕΚ ιδιοκτήτρια να κάμει ότι θέλει με το δικό της. Μαλακώνει «η δικιά μας» μπροστά σ'αυτή τη ιτράγωνη λογική, η τουρκοκύπρια κερνά καφέ και επιστρέφουμε στα πολίτισμένα πλαίσια του πιο πάνω μοντέλλου μας...

Κοινωνικη δομή και λειτουργία

Πολυπολιτισμικη κοινωνία και κοινωνικές αξίες

.......Ιστορικά η Κύπρος πρωτοστάτησε. στην εξέλιξη του ευρωπαϊκού πολιτισμού που βρίσκεται τώρα στο αποκορύφωμα της έμπρακτης μετουσίωσης του σε πολιτική πράξη και καθημερινή ζωή. Η μικρή μας πατρίδα θα έχει την ευκαιρία με την ένταξη στη Ευρωπαϊκοί Ένωση, να ανανεώσει αυτή τη πρόσφορα στην ανθρωπότητα και να βρεθεί και πάλι μπροστάρης στη πορεία του ανθρώπου προς τους ανώτερους προορισμούς που επιβάλλει η πολιτιστική μας παράδοση και που περιέχονται στο όραμα της ευρωπαϊκής σκέψης για τον άνθρωπο, τες κοινωνικές του δομές και τες διαπροσωπικές του σχέσεις.

Από αυτή την προνομιακή πολιτιστική θέση μπορούμε να κατανοήσουμε και να υλοποιήσουμε το ευρωπαϊκό όραμα στη μικρή μας πατρίδα. Να αγωνιστούμε ώστε όλη η πατρίδα μας και όλος ο λαός μας να απολαύσει και να επωφεληθεί από αυτό το όραμα χωρίς 'ελληνικές πορείες' με το πολιτικό επεκτατικό νόημα που τους έχουμε δώσει και ακόμα χωρίς 'επανελληνισμους' με την ολοκληρωτική και ανελαστική έννοια που αναπαράγουν τα αρχέγονα ένστικτα της σύνδεσης μας με την γη. Έτσι μπορούμε να δώσουμε ένα καινούργιο και ρεαλιστικό νόημα και συναισθηματική άξια στην επανένωση της πατρίδας μας. Με τη λύση του εθνικού μας προβλήματος [την όποια λύση που μας αποσυνδέει και μας προστατευει από το τουρκικο κρατος-] και με την προσηλωση μας στην ολοκληρωση του ευρωπαικου οραματος δεν θα μπορουν τα παλια μας **συναισθηματα και πνευματικες απολαυσεις /αγκυλωσεις να μεινουν καθηλωμενες σε σημερινα και χθεσινα ψυχοπνευματικα νοηματα . Η ψυχολογικη σημασια και** συναισθηματικη φορτιση που συνοδευε αυτα τα νοηματα (π.χ επανελληνισμος) μπορουν να απορροφηθουν απο την συλλογικη προσπαθεια και ακομα την πρωτοπορια ολων των κυπριων στην εξελιξη των ιδεωδων της ανθρώπινης αλληλεγγυης, της ανεξιθρησκειας και του εθνικου και πολιτιστικου πλουραλισμου και αλληλοσεβασμου. Καινουργιες πνευματικες και συναισθηματικες ικανοποιησεις της συμβιωσης, σε μια ενωμενη και ευημερουσα πατριδα, θα μας παρακινουν και θα μας εμψυχωνουν για νεους και ωραιους αγωνες για το μελλον των κυπριων που ξεπερνουν παλιες και αρχεγονες αγωνιες συνδεσης με τη γη και την ιδιοκτησια. Με μια τετοια συμπορευση αναπτυσσεται η εθνικη υπερηφανεια των κυπριων, ολων των εθνικοτητων και απαμβλυνονται η σταδιακα διαλυονται καταλοιπα πικρας και οδυνης απο εμπειριες του παρελθοντος.

....Ο αυτοκαθορισμος και αυτοπραγματωση του ενωμενου λαου μας γινεται σε ενα αλλο ανωτερο επιπεδο που δεν επηρεαζεται από την πολιτιστικη αναπτυξη , την εθνικη εξελιξη και τα τοπικιστικα συναισθηματα που αφηνονται πια στες τοπικες διοικησεις και τα τοπικα εθιμα να τα διαιωνιζουν και να τα καλλιεργουν.

.......Σιγουρα κατανοω τες τεραστιες δυσκολιες που παρουσιαζονται και δεν εχω την ψευδαισθηση οτι μια τετοια αλλαγη που προτεινω μπορει να επιτευχθει απο την μια μερα στην αλλη. Ωστοσο επειγει η προσπαθεια γιατι δεν μας παιρνει ο χρονος . Θα πρεπει να κανουμε, οσοι μπορουμε, την καρδια μας πετρα και να βοηθησουμε και τους αλλους που δεν μπορουν ωστε να δεχθουμε μια νεα κατασταση με νεους πνευματικους και πολιτικους οριζοντες και καινουργια συναισθηματα μιας νεας εποχης για την ανθρωποτητα, για μας και για την μικρη πικρη πατριδα μας. Καπου πρεπει να βρουμε την ανακουφιση ωστε να μην παρουμε φευγοντας την πικρα μαζι μας.

…….Αν θα αγωνιστουμε με το συνθημα της επανενωσης της πατριδας μας , που πραγματικα συγκινει τους πιο πολλους απο μας, ποιο νοημα και συναισθηματικη αξια θα εχει η επανενωση αν, στην καθημερινη μας ζωη , θα ειμαστε "εμεις ποδα τζιαι τζιεινοι ποτζιει" να κατοικούν στα χωριά μας με τα αλλαγμένα ονοματα;. Με ποια ιστορικη συνεχεια θα συγκινηθουμε και θα παρακινηθουμε στον αγωνα οταν η κρατικη οντοτητα και κυριαρχια (που τοσο αγαπησαμε οι πιο πολλοι απο μας και μας παρακινουσε σε αγωνες και αγωνιες) δεν θα εχει και πολλυ νοημα οπως θα κουτσουρευθει και θα απορροφηθει με την διακοινοτικη κατανομη της και την επικυριαρχία της ολοκληρωμενης Ευρωπαικης Ενωσης;

…….Οι απαντησεις σε ολα αυτα τα ερωτηματα, με αντικειμενικη και λογικα ψυχρη θεωρηση, επιβεβαιωνουν δυστυχως τους φοβους, τες αβεβαιοτητες και τα τραγικα αδιεξοδα που υπονοει η διατυπωση τους. Οι λογικα αναμενομενες καταθλιπτικες απαντησεις κανουν τα ερωτηαματα να πονουν ακομα πιο πολύ. Και αν αφεθουν να ταλαιπωρουν και να μελαγχολουν τες κυπριακες ψυχες θα οδηγησουν σε μια αγονη μοιρολατρια και απραξια που θα αποχαυνωσει τον λαο η θα οδηγησουν στην αρνηση και τη στειρα αδιαλλαξια. Και δεν εχουν απαντησεις που βοηθουν η παρηγορουν ενοσω μας διακατεχει η συναισθηματικη φορτιση που οπως εχω επισημανει πρεπει να επανεξετασθει. Οχι ομως μονο με την λογικη γιατι οπως ηδη τονισα δεν ειμαστε απλα εγκεφαλοι με συνημμενα σ' αυτους σωματα αλλα *συνολικοι ανθρωποι*

………NAI μπορούμε να συγχωρέσουμε αλλήλους για τα κακά και τες κακουχίες που προκαλέσαμε ο ένας στον άλλο όλα αυτά τα χρόνια του διχασμού και της ανόητης πολιτικής συμπεριφοράς και να κάνουμε ,συμφιλιωμένοι πια, μια καινούργια αρχή.

NAI μπορούμε να έχουμε καλές κοινωνικές σχέσεις και ακόμα εμπορικές συναλλαγές, με τα μέλη της άλλης κοινότητας έστω και αν αυτοί κατοικούν στα σπίτια μας και εκμεταλλεύονται τες περιουσίες μας εφόσον αυτό επεβλήθη σε όλους μας από τες ίδιες περιστάσεις.

NAI θέλουμε να δούμε και να ανακτήσουμε τα σπίτια μας και τες περιουσίες μας αλλά έχουμε την καλή διάθεση και ψυχραιμία να περιμένουμε μέχρι να γίνει τούτο εφικτό με διευθετήσεις και διαδικασίες που θα συμφωνηθούν μελλοντικά ενώ σίγουρα δεν έχουμε καμιά πρόθεση να πετάξουμε έξω εδώ και τώρα τον τωρινό κάτοικο τους ανεμίζοντας λάβαρα και συνθήματα για «πατρογονικές εστίες» και «απελευθέρωση πατρίων εδαφών»

OXI δεν μας ενοχλούν η χωριστή οντότητα και οι διοικητικοί θεσμοί η οι τοπικές αρχές της άλλης κοινότητας αλλά απλά δεν εγκρίνουμε τη διαιώνιση της διχοτόμησης της χώρας μας με το παράνομο κράτος με διεθνή προσωπικότητα που επιδιώκει ο Ντενκτας.

OXI δεν εγκρίνουμε τον εποικισμό που είδαμε πως είναι πρόβλημα για όλους του Κύπριους [τον δέχεται μόνο ο Ντεκνκτάς και το συνάφι του] αλλά και ούτε μας ενοχλεί η παραμονή των εποίκων εκείνων που εντάχθηκαν προσωπικά στην κυπριακή κοινωνία και δηλωμένα εγκρίνονται από κυπρίους που ζουν αρμονικά δίπλα τους.

ΝΑΙ είμαστε έτοιμοι συναισθηματικά και πολιτικά να δεχθούμε μια μορφή επανένωσης της χώρας μας, και δεν θα παρεμβάλουμε εμπόδια για συναισθηματικούς λόγους σε συνταγματικές, νομικές και διοικητικές διευθετήσεις που κρίνει η διεθνής κοινότητα, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, και η πολιτική ηγεσία οτι χρειάζονται γι αυτό τον σκοπό.

.......Θα πρέπει να ένοιωσαν μεγάλη ανακούφιση και αισιοδοξία οι τουρκοκύπριοι [και φυσικα όλοι μας] ακούοντας τον κ Τάσσο Παπαδόπουλο να περιλαμβάνει στην πρώτη του δήλωση, αμέσως μετά την εκλογή του στο αξίωμα του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας και τα εξής:— «θα επιδιώξω την επανένωση της πατρίδας μας σε συνεργασία **με τους τουρκοκύπριους αδελφούς μας**». Η χρησιμοποίηση μιας τέτοιας φρασεολογίας και η αναγνώριση των τουρκοκυπρίων σε τέτοιο βαθμό, εκ μέρους του Προέδρου της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, στέλλει σε όλους μήνυμα πίστης και προθυμίας για την συμβίωση και τη συνεννόηση με την άλλη κοινότητα για ειρηνικό μέλλον και ουσιαστική επανένωση της κυπριακής πατρίδας **και του λαού της.** Θέλω να πιστεύω πως η φρασεολογία αυτή θα καταξιωθεί στη συνέχεια με την ευόδωση των διαπραγματεύσεων για λύση τώρα που μας δίνεται η ευκαιρία και έχουμε τη στήριξη και συμπαράσταση της διεθνούς κοινότητας ώστε να προσβλέπουν όλοι οι Κύπριοι σ ' ένα καλύτερο και ειρηνικό μέλλον.

Εθνισμος, εθνικισμός και πατριωτισμός

...

....Η μακραιωνη ελληνικη πολιτιστικη παραδοση της Κυπρου αποτελεί για όλους μας συναισθηματικο σημειο αναφορας . Ανεξάρτητα απο τι λενε η τι φοβούνται οι εθνικιστες, κανενας ελληνοκυπριος δεν απαρνείται την εθνικη του ταυτότητα και τες εθνικες παραδοσεις και ουτε υπαρχει κανενας κίνδυνος απο οπουδηποτε για αλλοιωση αυτης της πραγματικοτητας. Φυσικα εκεινο που συναισθηματικα είμαστε και παραμενουμε και η ελληνικη πολιτιστικη πορεία που θέλουμε να συνεχίσουμε, δεν αποτελει προβλημα και ουτε παρεμποδιζει την οποιαδήποτε συνεννόηση με τους τουρκοκυπριους που με την ιδια λογικη ειναι και παραμένουν συναισθηματικα προσηλωμενοι στες δικες τους τουρκικες εθνικές παραδόσεις. Το τι επηρεαζει αρνητικα ειναι η συνδεση (που κανουν αρκετοι ελληνοκύπριοι) της πολιτιστικης ταυτοτητας με πολιτικες επιδιωξεις που συνοψιζονται στο σύνθημα "η Κυπρος ειναι ελληνική " η "η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία να είναι το δεύτερο ελληνικό κράτος "

…..Υπάρχει στην πολιτική μας ζωή μια εμπεδωμένη αντίληψη του αναπότρεπτου της συγκρουσιακής ιστορίας και σχέσης των δυο κοινοτήτων. Και αυτή η αντίληψη της ιστορίας και πραγματικότητας εμπεδώθηκε γιατί κατάφερε για χρόνια να αναπαράγει τη νοοτροπία της αντιπαράθεσης μεταξύ των πολιτικών ηγετών των δυο κοινοτήτων που παρεμποδίζει και αναιρεί για δεκαετίες κάθε προσπάθεια για επίλυση του πολιτικού μας προβλήματος. Και είναι επίσης γεγονός ότι αυτή η νοοτροπία της αντιπαράθεσης διέπει τον πολιτικό λόγο και την στρατηγική των πολιτικών αποφάσεων και ενεργειών των ηγεσιών και στες δυο κοινότητες Είναι «μαλλωμένοι» και δεν μπορούν να διανοηθούν και αποδεχθούν μια κατάσταση όπου θα «μερώσουν» και θα ζουν καθημερινά χωρίς πολιτικούς καυγάδες και ανταγωνισμούς , που στη σκέψη τους είναι η μόνη διαδικασία ανάδειξης του νικητή, του πολιτικά επιδέξιου και ικανού, του πετυχεμένου αγωνιστή. Ο αυθεντικός , «ιδεώδης τύπος» αυτού του πολιτικού απεικονίζεται τέλεια απο τον Ντενκτας αλλά τα βασικά του στοιχεία δεν λείπουν και από τους άλλους πολιτικούς μας και στες δυο κοινότητες. .

Σε όσους έχουν απασχοληθεί επαγγελματικά με τες διομαδικές και διαπροσωπικές ανθρώπινες σχέσεις η παρακολούθηση των πολιτικών μας ηγετών αυτές τες μέρες θυμίζει στρέβλωση και παθολογικές ψυχοκοινωνικές καταστάσεις. Ειναι το σύνδρομο του εθισμού με την αντιπαράθεση που μεταλλάσσει την συγκρουσιακή σχέση σε ψυχοκοινωνικη ανάγκη της καθημερινής ζωής. Το βλέπουμε στες συζυγικές διενέξεις , στες σχέσεις μεταξυ συγγενών και μεταξύ εχθρών και φίλων. Αρνούνται την εμφανή πραγματικότητα της συνεννόησης και της συμφιλίωσης που στα μάτια του αντικειμενικού ψυχοθεραπευτή εχει ηδη επιτευχθεί και αναζητούν αφορμές και προσχήματα – κάποτε παράλογα – για να συνεχίσουν την αντιπαράθεση ως ψυχολογική ανάγκη στην οποία έχουν εθισθεί.

Θρησκευτικότητα και διαπροσωπικες σχέσεις

………………..

<u>Πολιτιστική , εθνικη παράδοση και ταυτότητα</u> στην κυπριακή κοινωνία

….Σίγουρα μπορούμε πολιτικά να *αυτοκαθοριστούμε και αυτοπραγματωθούμε, ως ενωμένος λαός, σε ένα άλλο ανώτερο επίπεδο οπου δεν καθορίζεται η πολιτική μας θέση και πράξη από την πολιτιστική ανάπτυξη , την εθνική εξέλιξη και τα τοπικιστικά συναισθήματα που αφήνονται πια στές τοπικές διοικήσεις και τα τοπικά έθιμα να τα διαιωνίζουν και να τα καλλιεργούν. Σ'ένα άλλο επίπεδο όπου τα ιδανικά του ευρωπαϊκού πολιτισμού [στον οποίο ανακτούμε, με την ένταξη μας, την ιστορική ηγετική μας θέση] θεμελιώνουν μια νέα κατάσταση κοινωνικών και πολιτικών σχέσεων, οι οποίες θα μεταλλάξουν σταδιακά τες πολύπλοκες ρυθμίσεις που μας προτείνουν και θα ανατρέψουν τελικά τες οποιεσδήποτε αναχρονιστικές συνέπειες και προεκτάσεις του επικείμενου συμβιβασμού μας.*

<u>…Αν αποβάλουμε τες έντονες συναισθηματικές μας αντιδράσεις και αγκυλώσεις από</u> το παρελθόν μπορούμε να ενθαρρύνουμε την πολιτική μας ηγεσία να ενεργήσουν με υπευθυνότητα ώστε να πετύχουν ταυτόχρονα τη λύση του πολιτικού μας προβλήματος και την μορφή ένταξης που θέλουμε. Αντί να υποκύψουμε υποχρεωτικά σε απαιτήσεις των άλλων είναι αναμφισβήτητα πιο αξιοπρεπές να μεθοδεύσουμε εμείς οι ίδιοι την ένταξη που αποκλείει μια για πάντα την διχοτόμηση. Και αυτό μπορούμε να το πετύχουμε είτε με την ενεργό συμμετοχή μας στην διατύπωση της αναπόδραστης

«ουράς της Κοπεγχάγης» είτε με την προσυπογραφή μιάς λύσης η οποία μπορεί να μην μας χαροποιεί συναισθηματικά αλλά αφήνει ορίζοντες ανοιχτούς για μελλοντικούς αγώνες δικαίωσης και εκσυγχρονισμού της πολυπολιτισμικής κυπριακής κοινωνίας . Το χειρότερο ενδεχόμενο είναι να εθελοτυφλεί η πολιτική μας ηγεσία μπροστά στες σκληρές πραγματικότητες [ο Αγγλος Υφυπουργός των Εξωτερικών μας έχει ήδη απευθύνει ξεκάθαρη προειδοποίηση] και με αυτό τον τρόπο να πετύχουμε μεν την ένταξη αλλά ταυτόχρονα να μονιμοποιούμε τον διαμελισμό της μικρής ,πικρής πατρίδας. Οι ουρές των ευρωπαϊκών αποφάσεων θα γίνουν τότε ερινύες που θα κυνηγούν τες συνειδήσεις όσων πολιτικών ηγετών επιτρέψουν την καταδίκη των μελλοντικών γενεών των κυπρίων να βιώνουν εσαεί αυτή την στρέβλωση της ιστορικής μας κληρονομιάς.

The Canadian Experience with Federalism and Consociationalism

Are There Lessons for Cyprus?

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Comments welcome.

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Introduction

Canada, it is often said, is a country that does not work in theory but works in practice. My aim in this paper is, first, to outline some of the practices of the Canadian system that evolved, or were invented, to meet specific historical conditions and that broadly account for the Canadian federation's longstanding democratic stability and economic success; second, to examine the disintegrative pressures that the federation has recurrently to face from the forces of regional autonomism in general and Quebec separatism in particular, which are once again on the rise; and third, to ask whether the Canadian experience of federalism contains any lessons that might usefully be applied in designing a possible future federation for Cyprus.

National and Multi-national Federations

One frequently made distinction is between *national* (or "territorial") federations, such as Australia, Germany and the United States, where the boundaries of the constituent units do not coincide with ethnic, linguistic or religious boundaries, and *multinational* (or "multiethnic") federations, such as Belgium, India and Switzerland, where to a significant degree they do.[1]

The strengths and weaknesses of each model are well known and have been extensively debated. On the one hand, advocates of national federation see it as an instrument of nation-building. When equipped with political institutions designed to promote over-arching unity, such as an electoral system that requires parties and candidates to seek support outside their own ethnic communities, they argue, a national federation weakens ethnic cleavages and promotes stable democracy. Multi-national federation, in their view, too easily leads to a politics of ethnic division and ultimately to the break-up of the state. On the other hand, advocates of multi-national federation see it as an instrument for the peaceful accommodation within a single state of peoples of diverse nationalities. When equipped with suitable power-sharing institutions and constitutional guarantees of minority rights, particularly in such areas as language, culture and education, they argue, multi-national federation promotes a politics based on inter-communal cooperation and compromise. In their view, this is more conducive to stable democracy than a national federation, which denies meaningful self-rule to national minorities.

Canada does not conform to either model very closely, but rather is a hybrid federation that incorporates elements drawn from both. Moreover, its particular federal character has fluctuated widely over time in response both to external factors, such as global economic and technological changes or the impact of war or other events, and internal factors, such as demographic change or shifts in regional patterns of voting behaviour. And always – never far beneath the surface – there is the question of relations between Canada's dominant English-speaking majority and its French-speaking minority. That minority, moreover, is territorially concentrated in Quebec, where they constitute an overwhelming majority.

Majority-Minority Relations: Consociational Power Sharing, Canadian Style

The management of majority-minority relations has long been, and remains, a fundamental prerequisite for the maintenance of Canada as an effective political entity. That means primarily – but not exclusively – the management of English-French relations. Canada's aboriginal peoples also constitute territorially concentrated minorities who in some areas constitute a majority of the population, and increasingly Canadian governments have been forced by court decisions over

treaty rights and land claims (and the lingering sense of guilt over past injustices that French and English Canadians share alike) to respond to their demands for territory and self-determination. However, it is the "French fact" that forms the central thread of Canadian political history. For more than two centuries, under a variety of constitutional regimes, successive governments have sought to overcome the deep English-French cleavage that poses an ever-present threat to Canada's social peace and stability.[2] The two most important means employed in that always-difficult quest are federalism and consociationalism.

By *federalism* I mean a system of government which divides power among territorially-based constituent units, each of which is supreme within its own constitutionally protected area of jurisdiction, and whose people are governed simultaneously by and have a direct relationship with – for instance, by paying taxes to and electing – both the general government and the governments of the constituent units.[3]

By *consociationalism* I mean a system of sharing power among ethnic, linguistic, religious or national communities according to a combination of the following factors: cross-community representation in the executive; proportionality in the distribution of government offices and in the apparatus of government (e.g., the bureaucracy, military, judiciary, security services, and regulatory agencies); mutual veto over certain areas of constitutional change; and community autonomy in matters of vital cultural interest (e.g., education).[4]

To properly understand the nature of Canadian federalism is first necessary to understand that Canada adopted consociationalism before it adopted federalism.[5] In the pre-federal era of the "United Canadas" (1841-1867) the English and French political elites devised a system of consociational power-sharing that was very much their own invention. It was also a product of desperate necessity. Between 1836 and 1840 Canada was in a state of turmoil, culminating in armed uprisings against British rule in both sections of the country, though the most serious was the uprising of the French Canadians. The British response was to impose a new constitution in 1841 that merged the previously distinct provinces of Quebec and Upper Canada (Ontario) into one province. The aim of the merger was to turn the French majority in Quebec into an overall minority, the better to remove their long-established cultural rights, politically dominate them through majority rule, and (eventually) assimilate them. The constitution imposed upon Canada in 1841 was thus a classic recipe for civil war. Only the war never happened.

Instead, the English and French political elites stared into the abyss, saw clearly the danger of the new constitution to both of their communities, and took matters into their own hands. In effect, they made a deal to subvert the intention of the constitution that the Imperial government was determined to impose upon them. The essence of that deal was to form a French-English coalition of parties that would be strong enough to force the British to concede parliamentary democracy, and once that was achieved, to operate their new democracy on the basis of English-French power sharing – and not in accordance with the principle of majority rule, as their Westminster-style constitution seemed to dictate. The result, in short order, was a finely balanced consociational system that rested entirely on practice and convention. Unlike the Swiss federation of 1848 and other later European consociations, it was based on a political bargain and owed nothing to what has come to be termed "constitutional engineering." That ultimately proved to be a weakness, but at the time it was a source of strength because it added a necessary degree of flexibility to the system and deepened the bond of inter-elite trust on which all consociations ultimately depend. Among the key attributes of the original Canadian system were dual coalition ministries headed by French-English co-premiers, the recognition of both English and French as languages of parliamentary usage; rough proportionality in the bureaucracy (and

in the distribution of all forms of political patronage, which was widespread in that era), a requirement of dual legislative majorities for bills affecting the basic interests of either community, and effective autonomy for each community in matters of culture, language, religion, and civil law.

Some practices, such as the dual premiership, were dropped when the Canadian federation was formed in 1867, but the executive continued to be a French-English coalition and other consociational features were carried over more or less intact and became embedded in the operation of the new federal institutions, in some more successfully than in others. Though weakened by time and social change, they have never been completely abandoned.

Today, the Canadian federation continues to follow consociational practices in certain key areas of government. Some consociational features have been constitutionally entrenched, including the composition of the Supreme Court, three of whose nine members must be from Quebec; provincial autonomy in matters of language and culture, combined with guarantees of minority language and education rights in all parts of Canada and official bilingualism in all matters under the jurisdiction of the federal government; and a provincial veto in certain areas of constitutional amendment. But most remain conventional practices, such as proportionality in the executive; the alternation of French- and English-speaking leaders by the Liberal Party; and the acceptance by all the major parties that their leaders – who are prospective prime ministers – must be able to speak both languages. Proportionality is the goal (though rarely a matter of precise calculation) in federal institutions, including the armed forces, national police, judiciary, government departments, agencies, and publicly owned corporations. Moreover, consociational conventions have been extended in various ways to accommodate representatives of all provinces in the federal executive, and representatives of "allophone" (non-French, non-English) ethnic groups in the executive (when they are elected) and in prestigious appointive positions such as that of Governor-General, whose current occupant is a woman of Chinese ethnicity. In the private sector, consociationalism is nowhere legally required but is nevertheless pursued informally to a greater or lesser extent by many large corporations and civil society organizations.

Yet despite their long history and deep roots in Canadian society, both federalism and consociationalism are today under attack from a variety of different quarters. To understand the changed dynamic of Canadian politics it is necessary to turn briefly to developments in the Canadian party system since 1993.

The Fragmentation of the Canadian Party System

Historically, the long-term stability and unity of the Canadian federation owed much to role played by its two main political parties, Liberal and Progressive Conservative, both of which competed for support across regional, linguistic and class lines. Though they did not enjoy equal success, both were capable of winning majority support. In effect, both of the main parties were broad coalitions. They included representatives of different (and sometimes opposing) interests from all parts of the country and, crucially, at any given time one or the other would manage to bridge the English-French cleavage; in other words, at least one party generally managed to win solid support in both Quebec and the English-speaking provinces. And ideally, the governing party would also bridge the regional cleavages between the West, Central Canada, and the Atlantic provinces. The Liberal Party has been the most consistently successful party in this endeavour. According to some political scientists, it is a leading example of what they term a

"consocialional party" – that is, a party that is the functional location of inter-ethnic power sharing, as distinct from formal constitutional power sharing.[6]

In 1993, however, the Canadian party system experienced a sudden and dramatic upheaval.[7] In the election of that year the governing Progressive Conservative Party was virtually eliminated, dropping from 169 to a mere two seats, and was replaced by two very different regional parties. One of these, the Reform Party, was Western-based, populist, anti-French and radically conservative in its social and economic agenda. The other, the Bloc Quebecois, was a Quebec nationalist and separatist party whose social and economic outlook was on the left of the political spectrum. Canada was thus reduced to having only one broad-based, consociational party -- the Liberal Party.

That party has held power continuously from 1993 to the present. But its situation today is extremely precarious.

In the 2004 election it suffered electoral losses in most parts of the country, and heavy losses in Quebec. It manages to survive as a feeble minority government, winning only 131 out a total 308 seats in parliament. But its electoral base has shrunk, it is beset by scandals, and its defeat is imminent. A new right-wing Conservative Party (successor to Reform) dominates in Western Canada and has made some inroads further east, but it holds no seats at all in Quebec. The Bloc Quebecois now holds 54 of the 75 Quebec seats, which means that the third-largest party in the federal parliament is a party with one overriding goal: the secession of Quebec.

The next federal election, which could come as early as next month (June, 2005), could very easily produce a parliament in which there is no party that bridges Canada's deep regional and linguistic cleavages. If that happens, the survival of the federation will be threatened.

Opposition to Federalism and Consociationalism

Political opposition to federalism and consociationalism is nothing new, and indeed is as old as Canada itself.[8] Quebec has always had an influential nationalist counter-elite who regarded power sharing as a threat to their national aspirations. In their eyes, members of the federalist elite, such as Pierre Trudeau, were "vendus" ("sell-outs") who sacrificed Quebec's interests for the sake of Canadian unity and their own political careers. But today the positions are reversed. The nationalist counter-elite has become the new elite, and the federalist elite has become the counter-elite.

The social effects of this turnabout of elites have been generally rather muted. Indeed, French-English relations in Quebec remain harmonious, and indeed are probably more harmonious today than they have ever been. But the political effects have been dramatic. The hold of the old federalist political parties on Quebec has been decisively broken.

In English-speaking Canada, too, the political landscape has changed. The entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the constitution in 1982, and the wide popularity that the Charter enjoys, has led many people to conclude that rights protection is a preferred alternative to consociational power sharing in a modern, multicultural society. They generally support federalism, but increasingly view consociationalism as an out-dated set of conventions that encourages too great a focus on French-English issues to the neglect of others that they regard as more important.

But by far the most virulent and vocal opponents of both the present federal system and consociationalism are those who view *any* form of power sharing (apart from that provided for in a radically reformed federal system, which they favour) as nothing more than a corrupt way of "appeasing" Quebec. These tend to be concentrated in the West, where the French-speaking minority is small and where, for many reasons, an essentially American view of federalism (and many other matters) is widespread. They thus tend to view the Canadian federal system as a device for politically marginalizing the West and frustrating their desire for right-wing economic and social policies.

Finally, there is a rapidly growing body of new immigrant voters, drawn mainly not from Europe, as in the past, but predominantly from Asia, Latin America, and Africa, whose influence has yet to be fully felt. But there are some signs that they are not overly enamoured of either federalism or consociationalism, which to them look suspiciously like cosy deals between the French and the English to preserve their privileges.

Future Scenarios

Various scenarios present themselves. I shall briefly mention only three that I think have a reasonable chance of actually happening.

In the first scenario, the Canadian federation once again adjusts to changing circumstances, as it has done many times since 1867 through far greater crises than any it is facing at the present time. One possibility is that the new Conservative party will moderate its ideology and broaden its electoral appeal in Quebec and Eastern Canada, which would make it a true national party.[9] If this happens, a new Conservative government will need to make some long overdue institutional changes in the way the Canadian federation is governed. For a start, it could modernize the antiquated first-past-the-post electoral system, which distorts voter preferences and tends to disproportionately reward parties whose electoral support is regionally concentrated. And it could rationalize the federation's unimaginably elaborate and convoluted inter-governmental fiscal arrangements, which have accumulated over the course of 138 years and which hardly anyone today understands.

In the second scenario, a future Quebec referendum on secession results in a narrow "yes" vote on an ambiguous question (which is a curious Quebec tradition in such matters).[10] This forces the reopening of the "constitutional question" – something all governments have avoided doing since 1992, when the last major constitutional initiative proved deeply divisive and ended in failure. But a new initiative would take place in a different political climate and could have a different outcome. One possibility is that the Canadian federation would emerge as more fiscally decentralized and constitutionally asymmetric and multinational than it is today.

In the third scenario, Quebecers break with tradition and vote decisively on a clear question to secede from the federation and become an independent state. Since Quebec is closely integrated with neighbouring parts of Canada, it would obviously be in the in the interest of both Quebec and Canada to negotiate a new form of association. One possibility is that they would form a "federacy" (that is, a confederation of a federal Canada and the unitary state of Quebec).

Lessons for Cyprus

The historical and geographical differences between Canada and Cyprus are great and so obvious that there is no need to dwell upon them here. But there is also one important similarity: both Canada and Cyprus contain significant, territorially concentrated national minorities, the Quebecois and the Turkish Cypriots, who must be politically accommodated if either country is to have a future as a democratic and united country. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the many efforts to reunite Cyprus – up to and including the Annan Plan – have ended up prescribing essentially the same means that were adopted in Canada in the nineteenth century: federalism and consociationalism. It would be surprising if Canada's long experience with both could not teach at least a few relevant lessons. I would suggest that the following are perhaps the most relevant.

First, the people who must in the end operate a federal system are the ones who ought to design it. And it is they who must be responsible for redesigning it when it becomes outdated or dysfunctional – as inevitably it will. The Canadians designed their own system of consociational power sharing in the 1840s. It was not imposed upon them by anyone. On the contrary, the pressure exerted by the imperial power (Britain) was to try to *prevent* them from adopting consociationalism. There were brokers and facilitators, but they were internal political actors and not the supposedly impartial representatives of some outside body. In other words, the Canadian political elites, who were intimately involved in the political affairs of their respective communities, devised a power sharing system which they believed met the circumstances of the day. And when the circumstances changed, they changed the system accordingly. The Canadian drive towards federation in the 1860s was thus entirely directed and negotiated by the Canadian political elites and the federation they designed was their handiwork alone. If it failed, they had no one to blame but themselves.

The lesson that I draw for Cyprus is that the Cypriots need to take greater "ownership" of the reunification process. And that means a great deal more than voting in a referendum on some scheme that has been cooked up by the UN or the EU. In other words, the Annan Plan, like other failed schemes before it, was too much the handiwork of a legion of outside facilitators, brokers, and advisers of one kind or another, and too little the handiwork of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political leaders themselves. Yet those same leaders were then expected to go forth on television and sell the product. Let me be clear about the lesson that I am drawing. I am not saying that there is no legitimate role for international mediators, if both sides want them. But they should not be allowed to dominate the proceedings. It is not outsiders but the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot politicians who know best what will work politically, and what their respective communities will accept. If they make a deal, there is a good chance that they will make it work.

Second, the Canadian experience of federalism and consociationalism teaches that political parties are essential to the working of both. In Cyprus, I would suggest, there should be a great deal more attention paid to the nature and role of political parties in a future Cypriot federation. Canada today illustrates the dangers that may arise when parties fail to bridge sectional differences (and, I might add, the case of Northern Ireland is an even more extreme illustration). What would be the basis of future inter-party cooperation in Cyprus? Are there possible coalitions that would appeal broadly, North and South? In a democracy, political parties cannot be forced to play a role that they are unwilling to play. But, on both sides, those leaders who favour reunification need to think about ways to build incentives for party cooperation into the federal political process, through the electoral system and by other means.

Finally, Canadian experience teaches that federalism and consocational are only *approximate* models of power sharing and not exact prescriptions. Both permit a wide variety of possible options and (though some pure political theorists might disagree) the practice is more important than the theory. Given the Canadian track record, if there is a federacy or confederation somewhere in Canada's future, the odds are that it will not closely resemble other models, actual or theoretical. I therefore wish to end on a cautionary note. The "Canadian model" – like the "Swiss model," the "Belgian model" and even the "Bosnian model" – are useful reminders of various options that Cypriots might consider when discussing possible arrangements for their future governance.[11] But, in the final analysis, the only model that is likely to work is a "Cypriot model."

Notes

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[1] See Ronald L. Watts, *Comparing Federal Systems* (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999); Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, ed., *Multinational Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[2] S. Noel, "Canadian Responses to Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism, Federalism and Control," in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (London: Routledge, 1993), 41-61.
[3] This follows the classic definition of K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 1953), 1-15.
[4] See Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 25-52.
[5] For a detailed historical account of these developments see S. Noel, *Patrons, Clients Brokers* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 126-175
[6] See Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer, ed., *Party Elites in Divided Societies: Political Parties in Consociational Democracy* (London: Routledge, 1999).
[7] See R. Kenneth Carty, William Cross and Lisa Young, "A New Canadian Party System," in William Cross, ed., *Political Parties, Representation, and Electoral Democracy in Canada* (Oxford University Press 2002), 15-36.
[8] See Noel, *Patrons, Clients, Brokers*, 176-95; "Canadian Responses," 55-61.
[9] There are signs that this is path that the Conservative Party has chosen to follow. Its new leader speaks fluent French, its 2005 policy convention was held in Montreal, and the policies adopted represented an ideological shift towards the centre.
[10] The reason for this is that the opinion polls consistently show that the first preference of Quebec voters is for renewed federalism. Hence Quebec secessionist parties prefer to ask confusing, convoluted referendum questions that imply that secession really means the continuation of a close association with the rest of Canada. The federal government has countered with a "Clarity Act" which states that it will be under no obligation to negotiate secession with any province unless the referendum question placed before the electorate is clear.
[11] See Tozun Bahcheli and Sid Noel, "Power Sharing for Cyprus (Again)? European Union Accession and the Prospects for Reunification," in Sid Noel, ed., *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies* (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 215-38.

THE VISION OF A RE-UNITED CYPRUS

The organisers deserve every praise and gratitude from ordinary citizens of Cyprus for this special seminar devoted to the effort for re-unification of our country and our people. It is aptly timed because it is important to regain the social psychological momentum for re-unification which was widely felt during the final stage of the accession process of our country to the EU . Let me explain why I think there was such a momentum for reunification which needs to be regained:

It all started with the initiative of the United Nations to propose for the first time a detailed and comprehensive plan for reunification which was accepted almost unanimously by our political leaders as a basis for the solution of our problem. This was an unprecedented development. From a political perspective there may be complicated ramifications and explanations of this development but the psychological impact on the people was that **reunification was at last in sigh**t. There was still, of course, in the picture a negative Denktash but even he appeared to have given reassurances to the European Council . In the conclusions of its session, which approved the accession of Cyprus to the Union, it is clearly mentioned that: - **the Council expresses its satisfaction for the commitment of the leaders of the two communities to seek an agreement on the basis of the proposals of the UN Secretary General so that a united Cyprus would join the Union .**
Reunification was in the air – imperatively necessary and generally desired.

There followed a series of events, which successively reinforced the social psychological momentum for reunification. Here are some examples of such events of the period just before accession to the EU. I summarise them purposely in a simplistic manner and avoiding the complications of political tangents , in order to highlight their psychological impact:

- All political parties expressed support for the efforts of the Klerides government for arriving at a settlement as soon as possible. Their public announcements contributed to a climate of GREEK CYPRIOT reconciliation with the reality that the Turkish Cypriot community had an equal right in determining the future of our country and in participating in the governmental structure of a re-united Cyprus. Ordinary people were getting the message that

the psychological climate of antagonism and conflict between the two communities was on the wane.

- The mass media spread optimism and smiles for reunification by giving positive and supportive coverage of Mr Denktash driving through the streets of Nicosia, on this side of the division line, towards Mr Clerides house where he was invited for dinner. Mr Clerides welcomes him from his verandah with smiles and traditional Cypriot hospitality. The indisputable psychological effect on people watching television was that it all seemed so natural and appropriate. Surely they will soon come to an agreement and Cyprus will be reunited.

- General elections take place in Turkey (where everything is decided as we say) .These elections bring to power a new and unknown political leader and effectively marginalize every political party and all politicians with a negative past regarding the Cyprus problem. The new leader announces that the traditional policy of no solution will be abandoned. Later he meets with UN Secretary General and announces his acceptance of the proposed plan for a solution to the Cyprus problem. People felt that "turkish intransigence" the notorious, age-old obstacle to all efforts for a solution is no more.

- Events in the TC community were even more impressive than the change of mind in Turkey. Breaking the tradition of fear of the occupation army, political parties of the opposition and people in general, take to the streets condemning Denktash's policy and demanding solution and reunification now. Greek Cypriots watch the demonstrators on television sending smiles and brotherly salutes to them and waving the flag of the Republic of Cyprus - the symbol so hated by Denktash and his nationalist separatists. The social psychological momentum for reunification receives a powerful boost.

- Presidential elections on the Greek Cypriot side, which intervened, may have inserted some confusing elements in the process but again one could easily see that both presidential candidates competed in sending messages of optimistic determination for a course of reunification in cooperation with the Turksish Cypriot community. In his election speeches the winner candidate, supported by the traditionally pro - reunification AKEL,

repeatedly refers to his wish to solve the Cyprus problem "in cooperation with our Turkish cypriot brothers" , **as he put it in an unprecedented terminology explicitly promoting a friendly and unifying climate.**

- Then came the climax of the social psychological momentum for reunification. In a sudden political move , which was a surprise to everyone, Denktash lifted the prohibition of movement of Greek Cypriots to the occupied areas. Greek Cypriots by the thousands rushed to the checkpoints, which were opened, waiting patiently for hours to cross over and visit their villagers and their houses. Contrary to the expectation of nationalist separatists on both sides there were joyous and heartening scenes of love and understanding as co-villagers met after thirty years . Turkish Cypriots and even settlers who occupy GC houses welcomed the rightful owners without any ill feeling or even discomfort. The standard TC attitude was something like this: "This is your house of course , there is no doubt of that , I hope a solution will be found soon so that all this can end amicably for all of us". The response of the Greek Cypriot was thankful for the welcome and , over a drink coffee or the traditional sweet, a new or renewed friendship begins. **Reunification is real and alive on the ground.**

- In this generally positive climate the UN Secretary- General invites the leaders of the two communities to New York and announces, at the end of intensive consultations, that an agreement has been reached for negotiating a solution on the basis of the UN proposals. The two leaders even consented to giving the secretary General the right to arbitrate in case the negotiations did not lead to an agreement. It all seemed that political leadership in both communities were really determined for a solution. **Reunification was in the air, in people's minds and hearts, in social conversations and social gatherings in the squares of "occupied greek" villages of the north or "reconstructed Turkish" villages of the south.**

Then I don't know what happened. Or maybe I do not wish to know...............

I do know that at this stage there is disappointment and a feeling of abandonment of the goal of reunification in both communities. And I do know that there is an urgent need to regain the lost social psychological momentum for reunification. I realise, of course, that there are many forms of action which can contribute to this end because the so called Cyprus problem is a very complicated situation with military, economic, political and social psychological components. I am not sure whether anyone can place all of these components in order of importance but I do hope that military experts, economists and political scientists will all make their contribution by suggesting actions which will help restore the will for reunification or even lead to a political agreement. But I feel that the latter will take a long, very long time time indeed . And it may never happen ....

On my part I will humbly propose some ideas which may help reverse the psycho- social climate which hinders the process of reunification. And I am not referring to the solution procedures but a social psychological unity of people **irrespective of plans and proposals and negotiations for a solution.** My proposals transcend the parallel effort to arrive at a political solution although I believe they are necessary for making such a solution workable.

Firstly I propose that we need to persuade politicians and other activists in both communities to abandon the psychological syndrome of conflict-oriented national assertiveness

Most of our political leadership and many opinion forming agents define their rights in terms of national assertiveness. And because there has been a well known national division for too many years and most politicians have grown up with this division, national assertiveness has become an acquired personality trait or psychological syndrome . It takes the form of "we on our side" and "they on the other side". We on our side have been wronged and molested because of our national identity and the claim of our national rights. And they are to blame. We have to assert our national rights and fight them who deny us these rights. If they win in their national assertiveness we shall lose. This mentality of natural or spontaneous opposition and antagonism also serves as a criterion or logical background for interpreting political behaviour - **but always on the other side .**

Even when there is an obvious or logical convergence of opinion and intention, the national assertiveness syndrome persists in the form of a "pseudo- antagonism" as I have called it – one of the many "pseudo's" that beleaguer our unfortunate modern European society. And all this in spite of the maturity with which ordinary Cypriots react to division and political conflict as witnessed by their behaviour and their relationships since the lifting of restrictions of movement across the divide.

I have often said that the assertive conflict relationships between the political leaders of the two communities resemble those of the married couple who are trying to make it up after a period of separation and emotionally loaded conflict. The social psychologist, to whom the married couple resort for help , objectively realises that their wish to make it up is genuine and his diagnosis shows that it is possible for them to continue their normal married life. He tells them so and both the spouses agree because, a**t the level of conscious logical thinking**, they can see that there are no more serious obstacles to their reconciliation.

However, there is a psychological process which accustoms people to conflict behaviour and so the spouses keep returning to accusations of each other which undermine the decision to return to their normal marital relationship. The winner-loser habit seems to be embedded in the psychological make-up of most people.
In the case of the married couple there is need for intensive therapy so that they can understand each other's feelings and work out a reconciliation.

In the case of the political leadership of the two communities of our country social scientists will have to indicate to them the need for introspection of which I am sure they are capable. We can help them to bring to consciousness, to understand the strong resistance exercised by this long standing habit of antagonism based on an acquired and basically pathological psychological trait of national assertiveness.

I am saying all this of about our politicians in all humility and fully aware that it may be utopia.

Let me return to the people!!

Secondly I propose that we all get down to work in order to prepare the components and public dissemination of a socially based vision of a reunited Cyprus which will be amotive for positive action and a source of pride for all Cypriots .

This is the most painful part of my speech.

In the autumn of 1974 while the atrocities of the intervention by the Greek military fascists were still fresh in our minds, while smoke was still coming out of the ruins of the Turkish invasion of our country, while thousands of refugees were still sleeping under bridges and trees and hundreds of yellow-faced terrified Cypriot prisoners were returning from Turkish prisons I made the following appeal to my Cypriot compatriots everywhere:

Let us wipe out the burning tears from our cheeks , let us make use of the process of catharsis from the tragedy we have just experienced and design the blueprint of action to lay the foundations of a new Cyprus motherland of all Cypriots. I proposed that a crucial component of this vision was to be found in the cooperation of the two basic communities of our land for the cultivation of a climate of Cypriot patriotism and love for our Cypriot motherland.

It is with severe pain in my heart that three decades later I have to do this again…

But I will do it. Beguiled and flabbergasted as we are at this time by the endless discussions of complicated legal, political , constitutional and I don't what other plans and developments we may lose sight of Cypriot spiritual, social and psychological unity, which is the ultimate, the real, the complete and logical final solution of the so-called Cyprus problem. I repeat that cypriot unity is the ultimate possible and desirable social situation whatever the solution or even without a solution of the Cyprus problem. It transcends politics and time because it is part of social progress, it is the foundation of civilised existence for a traditionally civilised , kind, and peace-loving people. It is the restoration of normal social structure and function in a European society of the 21st century. It is the abandonment of social dysfunction and psycho-social pathology.

The vision of that unity can now be restated in the light of a new dimension of the political status of our motherland : its formal accession to the European Union.

We joined at a stage when the citizens of the European Union and their respective political leaders in a number of waning nation-states are going through a critical and intensive search for a unifiying identity.

It is not the first time that the inhabitants of our continent are going through such a stage. They had a similar experience at the beginning of the previous millennium. It was the time when the powerful Roman Empire which had provided an imposed identity was beginning to fall apart. A new faith which had begun in aan unknown corner of the Middle East spread rapicly westward . It acted as a new source of identity definition which was literally a god sent gift for the Europeans of the time. Cyprus played then a leading role not only because of its geographical position at the gate of Europe but also because of its cultural tradition which facilitated the spread of a new religion. This historical leadership role of our country can become a significant component of our vision of a reunited Cyprus. We have before us a new challenge to reassume a leadership role. Because the forging of a new European identity depends greatly on the capacity of its citizens to learn to live together in a multicultural multi religious context we can provide them with a living model.

We can be the first European state where the ideals of religious and cultural tolerance can become formally the basis of a political structure. A political structure which specifically provides for power sharing and common administrative decision making which cuts across long standing religious and even linguistic divisions. We shall be the living paradigm of the ideal European state and therefore the leaders of the upward course of European civilisation. We shall be the initiators of a historical development for the whole of mankind.

The awareness and assimilation of this privileged cultural position , by all Cypriots, will give them the psychic strength to overcome some emotional hang-ups and traumatic experiences of our distant and recent past:

- our estrangement from our personal land and
- the loss of most of our religious and national habitats in the north and the south of our country respectively.

New spiritual and emotional satisfactions of co-existence , in a united and prosperous motherland will motivate all Cypriots and inspire them for new and beautiful struggle which alleviate and gradually eliminate remnants of past bitterness and pain. The definition of a new identity and self –realisation by a united people is raised to another higher level where its social and economic progress are diverted from localised , cultural and ethnic traditions which are now left to local administration and social structures.

Cypriots will begin to feel the historical duty to maintain the unity and integrity of their Cypriot motherland. Bound by this holy duty, and responding to the call of the eternal motherland, Cypriots will not allow relatively recent ethnic aspirations and sentiments to stand in their way. Thus, patriotism will regain its true orientation and our people will continue their upward course towards a bright and prosperous future.

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